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There  is  general agreement in the  economics literature
that resource flows  among countries  in response to market
incentives enhance global economic efficiency and welfare  in
both rich and poor countries.  It has also been argued that  in
the presence of capital market  imperfections the  transfer of
resources from developed country governments  to  the  governments
of developing countries on commercial terms,  either directly or
through multilateral agencies, can normally be expected to be
welfare-enhancing in both developed and developing  countries.1
These arguments do not apply, however, to official development
assistance  that involves  a substantial grant element.
Two  arguments have typically been used in support of
transfers that include a grant component.  One  set  of arguments
is based on the economic and strategic  self-interest of the
donor country.  A second set  of arguments  is based on the
ethical  or moral responsibility of the  residents  of wealthy
countries  toward the residents  of poor countries.  Both sets of
arguments have been the  subject of continuous challenge.I argue in this paper  that neither the donor self-interest
nor the ethical responsibility argument can be rejected on
logical or theoretical grounds. I  also argue  that the  empirical
evidence in support of both the  economic and the strategic
self-interest arguments is  exceedingly weak. The ethical
responsibility arguments impose less burden on  the empirical
evidence.  But, they have been subject to continuous  challenge
by political theorists  and moral philosophers.
Donor Self-Interest
Donor self-interest arguments tend to assert that
development assistance promotes  the economic or political
interests of  the donor country.  This argument is  frequently
made  in official and popular pronouncements in defense of
developed country aid budgets.2  The donor self-interest
argument has  also been made by the critics  from the left who
assert that aid impacts negatively  on political and economic
development  in poor countries. 3  The empirical evidence
suggests  that donor self-interest plays  a relatively large role
in bilateral assistance while recipient need plays a larger
role  in multilateral assistance.4
Economic  Interest
Most economic  self-interest arguments  employ some version
of the  argument that aid promotes exports from and employment
in the  donor country.  The crude version of this argument
simply appeals to  the obvious gains  to the U.S.  economy fromexports of commodities or services or  to  the specific
industries whose commodities  or services  are subsidized by the
assistance program.  U.S. producers of food grains benefit  from
food assistance, workers  in the maritime industry gain from
cargo preference provision, and U.S. engineering firms  gain
from contracts associated with infrastructure development
projects.  Programs  to protect private  overseas investment
against economic  and political risk have been a prominent
component of U.S. and many other national assistance programs. 5
A somewhat less  obvious appeal to  specific  interests often
emphasizes  the generalized role of aid in strengthening
commercial  ties between the donor and the  recipient.
Commercial  contacts developed during a period of assistance  for
the development of a nation's transportation or communication
network can be  expected to  continue.  As  the recipient
country's  infrastructure develops, commercial demand for new
and replacement equipment compatible with the aid-assisted
investments  is  expected to widen commercial  sales
opportunities.  Similarly, technical  assistance for  the
development of an LDC grain milling and feed processing
industry  is viewed as  enhancing the commercial demand for  food
and feed grains  from the  donor country.
A more sophisticated argument is  often made  that  if aid is
effective in contributing to LDC economic growth the effect
will be an expansion of demand for  those DC goods and services
characterized by high import demand elasticities.
6 U.S.agricultural producers are urged not to become overly concerned
about loss of, for  example, oilseed markets  to Malaysia and
Brazil because as  incomes rise, growth in demand for animal
proteins will generate demand for U.S.  feed grains.  Loss  of
exports by the mature  industrial sectors will be more than
compensated for by capital  goods and high technology exports. 7
The first two arguments rest on relatively weak logical
foundations.  The use  of assistance resources  to  subsidize
domestic suppliers of commodities  or services generally reduces
the value of a given level of assistance to  the recipient
country.8  This concern has  generated a vigorous  argument about
the value and impact of food assistance. 9  Other areas,  such as
tied procurement of such services as  technical assistance, have
been subject to much less  controversy.  But there can be  little
question that the  effect of aid tying is  to raise the cost to
the donor of providing whatever benefits recipients receive
from development assistance.
The growth impact argument rests  on stronger logical
grounds.  It  should be  technically possible to specify
conditions under which government-to-government aid transfers
involving a grant element could improve welfare  in both donor
and recipient countries.10  The empirical analysis to  support
this argument is, however, surprisingly limited.  It  is  not
sufficient simply to assert that the  transfer of assistance
resources may be followed by the growth of exports  from the
donor to  the  recipient country.  The welfare gains and lossesto  donors and recipients must be calculated.  As  of yet neither
the contribution of aid recipients' growth on donor trade
balances nor the welfare gain and loss calculations have been
made.11
Political and Strategic Interest
The view that development assistance  is  a useful
complement to  other elements  of donor political strategy--that
its primary rationale  is  to  strengthen the political commitment
of the aid recipient  to  the donor country or  to  the West--has
been a consistent and at times dominant  theme in the motivation
for development  assistance.12  Political considerations in both
donor and recipient countries have, however, often made it
advisable to  cloak the objectives of short-term political or
strategical assistance with the rhetoric of economic
assistance--hence terms such  as economic support  fund in the
USAID budget. 13
The strengthening of the  capacity of Western Europe to
resist external aggression and the enhancement of the political
appeal of centrist political forces were major motivations for
the Marshall Plan.14  Strategic concerns were a prominent
feature of the Kennedy administration's  "Alliance for Progress"
in the  early 1960s.15  The Carlucci report, commissioned by the
Reagan administration, insisted that "the  foreign security and
economic  cooperation programs of the United States  are mutually
supportive and  interrelated and together constitute  an integral
part of the  foreign policy of the United States."
1 6  The
5commission urged that efforts be made  to enhance  the
complementarity between U.S. economic  and security programs
through the creation of a Mutual Development and Security
Agency that would bring development, military, and related
assistance programs under one agency.
One of the issues  that one would like to  see examined more
fully is  the  issue of complementarity and conflict between the
achievement of short-run political strategic objectives and
longer-run political development  in the recipient country.  It
is  not too difficult  to find examples of cases where donor
efforts  to achieve short-run political or economic objectives
appear to have been inconsistent with longer-term recipient
political development  (Vietnam, Nicaragua, Philippines).  A
common assumption in the earlier literature was  that Western
style  "democratization" and "bureaucratization" would be in  the
interest of both the  donor and the recipient.  But the  study of
political development has provided few guidelines for policy
makers or practitioners who would guide political development
along mutually advantageous  lines. 17
In Summary
There  is an interesting dichotomy  in the dialogue  about
the use  of foreign assistance in the pursuit of domestic
economic and strategic interests.  It  is  clear that self-
interest and security arguments have often represented little
more  than cynical efforts  to generate support for  the  foreignassistance budget.  There have been serious efforts  to examine
the  theoretical foundations  of the economic self-interest
argument.  There have also been increasingly serious  attempts
to  evaluate the  economic and social  impacts of economic
assistance  in developing countries.  In addition to  a large
professional literature,  the U.S. Agency  for International
Development has conducted and published more than 100  Project
Evaluations, Evaluation Special  Studies, and Program Evaluation
Reports.  The World Bank has an Operations  Evaluation
Department that engages  in a major program of project
completion evaluation studies.
The  security rationale has not, however, been subject to
nearly  as  rigorous  theoretical or empirical analysis. 18  The
single background paper on the  effectiveness of military
assistance prepared for  the Carlucci Commission asserted a
positive linkage between U.S. security assistance expenditures
and security interests while admitting that  the evidence to
support the  assertion is  "elusive."19  This  is  not to  suggest
that empirical  support cannot be provided to  support the
political and strategic self-interest arguments.  It  is  simply
to  argue that,  in spite of Huntington's assertion that the
results of security assistance have been at  least as  successful
as  efforts  to promote economic development,20 little convincing
evidence has appeared in the professional literature on
development  assistance.There  is  an inherent contradiction in both the economic
and the security self-interest arguments.  There  is  a danger
that donor countries may pursue their self-interest under the
rubric of aid even if  it harms  the recipient country.  If the
donor self-interest argument is utilized as  a primary rationale
for development assistance  it imposes  on donors some obligation
to demonstrate  that its  assistance does no harm to  the
recipient.
One effect of the  economic and security self-interest
arguments has been to clarify that donor governments and
assistance constituencies are  not indifferent  to the  form of
the resource  transfers  they make to poor countries.  Security
assistance draws on a set of  ideological concerns that often go
beyond a rational calculation of donor self-interest.  Food aid
taps not only the  self-interest of donor commodity producers
but also a powerful set of altruistic concerns in donor
countries about poverty, hunger, and health in poor
countries.21  It  is doubtful that  these forms of assistance are
directly competitive--if food aid were reduced, the  resources
released would not become available to support the  security
assistance  budget.
Ethical Considerations
Efforts  to develop an acceptable rationale for development
assistance have not been confined to  self-interest arguments
and rationalizations.  There has been an extended argumentabout the moral responsibility of rich countries to  assist  in
reducing poverty and enhancing economic development in poor
countries over and above  any considerations of self-interest.
But neither  the advocates nor critics of foreign assistance
have adhered to careful distinctions between self-interest  and
moral responsibility.
The typical criticism of foreign assistance starts  out
with an argument that the resources devoted to  foreign
assistance have been wasted--that assistance has not achieved
either  its intended economic or political objective.  The
argument then tends  to be  followed by an argument  that in any
event it  is  not legitimate, within the  framework of Western
political philosophy, for government to  forcefully extract
resources  from citizens  in order  to transfer them to
foreigners.22
Both the popular and official sponsors of foreign
assistance have typically treated the  ethical basis  for  foreign
assistance as  intuitively obvious.23  There  is,  however, a
substantial professional  literature that has attempted to
identify a basis in  ethical theory or political philosophy for
income  or resource transfers made  to enhance welfare  in a
recipient country even when the  transfer is at  the  expense of a
reduction in welfare in the donor country.  In addition, since
government-to-government transfers are  often involved, an
attempt is sometimes made to explore  the basis  for a claim bythe recipient country for assistance or of the obligation of
the donor country to  the  recipient country.
Entitlement
An argument  frequently put forth during the  "New Economic
Order" dialogue of the 1970s  was that  there should be
compensation by the rich countries  to poor countries for past
injustices  stemming from political domination and economic
exploitation. 24
A second entitlement argument is  based on the uneven
distribution of natural resources.  It has been argued that
natural resources are part of our global heritage and that
those areas that are favorably endowed have an obligation to
share rents  from differential resource endowments with those
areas  that are less favorably endowed.25
The argument based on past injustice, while correct in
principle, poses substantial difficulties  for translation into
contemporary assistance policy.  If exploitation occurred and
compensation was not made, the  effect of compound interest is
to magnify the  size of the obligation.  Much of the assistance
provided by Great Britain and France, the  two major colonial
powers,  has been directed to former colonies and dependencies.
Lenin's model of imperialism, in which capital was  exported to
low-income staple-producing areas under the direct or indirect
political control of the major powers  and which earned
enormously high rates of return for a narrow class  of investors
in the metropolitan country has, not held up even to  casual
10examination.26  It has been difficult  to establish the extent
to which the  imperial relation was,  in fact, exploitative.2 7  A
more relevant argument in a world of both overt and "voluntary"
constraints on the movement of commodities,  labor,  and
financial resources  is  that  developed countries have
inadequately  "exploited" the human and physical resources  of
the poor countries.
It  is  also difficult to decide what weight should be  given
to  the natural resource distribution argument.  One can hardly
argue that the  inhabitants  of Kuwait and Somalia "deserve" the
differential resource endowments  they have  inherited.  Yet
natural  resource endowment differentials do  not represent a
very powerful  factor in explaining differential growth rates
among either developing or developed countries.  The difficulty
of converting staple exports  into a base for  sustained national
or regional economic development has been a difficult challenge
even in situations  that have not been characterized by obvious
expolitations--except in the rather meaningless Marxian view
that insists  that all production and exchange are characterized
by exploitation.28  Perhaps  the area in which the natural
resources  distribution issue is  of greatest contemporary
significance  is  the  debate about the management and
distribution of the potential rents associated with the
exploitation of the  global commons--the  ocean and space
29 resources.
11Distributive Justice
Most economists have generally felt fairly comfortable--
perhaps too  comfortable--with a straightforward utilitarian
rationale for foreign assistance.  If private  rates of return
to capital investment are higher  in developing countries than
in developed countries, investment should flow from developed
to  less developed countries.  If, because markets  are
imperfect, social rates of return exceed private  rates of
return, then developed country governments should transfer
resources to  developing countries  to assist in physical and
institutional infrastructure development.  But few economists
would be willing to  embrace the  full implications  of the
utilitarian income distribution argument--that rich countries
ought to  give until the point is  reached at which by giving
more, the  loss  in utility in the donor country would exceed the
gain in utility in the  recipient country or countries.
In contrast, most political philosophers, and those
economists who adhere  to a Hobbesian contractarian view of the
role of government, have found it difficult to  discover any
intellectual  foundation for development assistance based on
considerations of distributive justice.  At the most extreme
there is  the argument by Hayek that in a society of free men
the concept of social or distributive justice has no meaning.
"Justice has meaning only as  a rule  of human conduct and no
conceivable rules  for  the conduct of individuals supplying each
other with goods  and services in a market economy would produce
12a distribution which could be meaningfully described as  just or
unjust."3 0   Hayek argues,  in effect,  that justice is a function
of the rules  or processes that govern individual  and group
behavior and not of  the outcome generated by the  rules.  The
appropriate  role of public policy is  rule reform.
The Hobbesian contractarian argument with respect to
foreign aid has been forcefully articulated by Banfield:  ".
our political philosophy does not give our government any right
to do good for foreigners.  Since the  seventeenth century,
Western political thought has maintained that government may
use  force or threat of force  to  take the property of some and
give  it  to others  only if doing so somehow serves the common
good...government may take from citizens and give  to  foreigners
when doing so  serves the common good of the  citizens, but it
may not do so  if  ...  all advantage will accrue  to  foreigners
and none to  citizens."3 1  This argument has been forcefully
restated by Nozick,32  and it has recently reemerged with
renewed force in the debate  over foreign assistance  in the  late
1970s  and early 1980s. 33  It seems  apparent that  the emergence
of social justice as a significant issue on the political
agenda, both within nations  and in international  relations, is
due  to  lack of confidence that  the actual behavior of economic
markets  and political institutions adequately approaches the
conditions  specified by Hayek, Nozik, and other libertarian
political philosophers.3
13Attempts have been made to  develop a contractarian
argument drawing on the Rawlsian "difference principle"  to
establish a moral obligation for  foreign assistance.  The
central part of Rawls' theory  is  that  in a just society
departures from an equalitarian income distribution would be
permitted only when differential  rewards contribute to  the
welfare of the  least advantaged members  of society.  Rawls
argues  that this  "difference principle" would be  agreed to by
rational individuals attempting to design a constitution--given
full general knowledge of the political and economic nature of
society except the positions that  they would occupy by virtue
of social class,  individual talent, or political persuasion.
The Rawlsian constitution does not  imply perfect equalization
of incomes.  If, for  example, inequality calls  forth economic
activity that benefits the least as well as  the more advantaged
members of society, it would be permitted. 35
Rawls made no attempt to  explore the  implications of the
difference principle for international inequality.  Beitz and
Runge have argued that an intuitively obvious extension of the
difference principle to the  international economic order  is
that justice would imply equal access by citizens of all
countries  to global resources  except  in those cases where
departure  from inequality could be justified on the basis of
benefits to citizens of the  least advantaged countries.3 6  This
argument goes beyond the  "past injustice" resource entitlement
argument discussed above.  To the extent that  it draws  on the
14Rawls  framework, however,  it remains vulnerable to  the weakness
of attempting to  derive rules  of justice from an "imagined
social contract."37  I would personally prefer a stronger
behavioral  foundation on which to rest convictions about moral
responsibility for  assistance to poor countries.  This
preference reflects  a more general  skepticism about both the
contractarian approach to political philosophy and  the public
choice approach to political economy that attempt to  derive
principles for  the design of social and economic  institutions
from primitive assumptions about human nature.
A second level  of argument  insists  that both the moral and
rational arguments that have been used to  support ethical
responsibility for distributive justice  apply to  individuals
(or families) and not  to collectives such as  nations. 38  The
problem of extending the ethical arguments  that have been
developed to apply to  individuals to nations has been difficult
to  resolve in spite  of the  strong popular sentiment that rich
nations  do have some  responsibility for assisting poor nations
to  achieve adequate  levels  of nutrition, health, and education.
"Much recent discussion on transfer of resources  falls
uncritically into the practice  of  ...  anthropomorphizing
nations, of treating nations as  though they are  individuals  and
extrapolating to  them on the basis of average per capita income
the various ethical arguments that have been developed to  apply
to  individuals.  This  is not  legitimate.  If ethical arguments
are  to be used as a rationale for transferring resources,
15either a new set of ethical principles  applicable to nations
must be developed, or the link between resource transfers  must
be made back to  the individuals who are the ultimate subjects
of standard ethical reasoning."39
An  Implicit  Global  Contract
A contractarian argument that limits  the responsibility of
the rich toward the poor to national populations has great
difficulty in confronting a world where citizens hold multiple
loyalties, where national identity may be wider or more narrow
than state boundaries, where policy interventions  as well as
market forces  guide the  flow of labor and capital and the trade
in commodities and  intellectual property across  state
boundaries.40  In this world a "state-moralist"  or "political
realist" approach to  international relations  that would limit
the  expression of the moral concerns of either individual
citizens or national governments about the basic political
rights  or subsistence needs of people in other countries  seems
curiously archaic.
Increased interdependence among nations  results in a rise
in both political tension and concern about lack of equity in
economic transactions.  The ethical foundation for a system of
development assistance rests on the premise that  the emergence
of international  economic and political interdependence has
extended the moral basis for  social or distributive justice
from the national to  the international sphere.  This
international  interdependence has resulted in an  implicit
16extension of Arrow's argument for redistribution to  include the
international sphere:  "There are significant gains  to social
interaction above and beyond what individuals  can achieve on
their own.  The owners  of scarce personal assets do  not have
substantial private use of these assets;  it is  only their value
in a large system which makes  these assets valuable.  Hence,
there  is  a surplus created by the existence of society which is
available for redistribution."41
The growth of global and political interdependence  implies
a decline  in the significance  of national boundaries.  Since
boundaries are not coextensive with the scope  of economic  and
political interdependence,  they do not mark the  limits of
social obligation in the  sharing of the benefits and burdens
associated with interdependence.42  A functioning international
economy increases the value of the natural, human, and
institutional resources of the developed countries and makes
part of  this surplus available  for redistribution.
Some Questions
Acceptance of an ethical responsibility by the citizens
and the  governments of rich countries for assistance to poor
countries still  leaves unanswered a number of  important
questions.
Acceptance of an ethical responsibility for development
assistance by the rich countries does not resolve  the question
of what level of assistance is  appropriate.  It was noted
earlier  that the utilitarian or consequentialist  argument seems
17to be based on equating marginal utilities--the rich countries
ought to  give until the point is  reached at which by giving
more, the  loss  in utility in the donor country would exceed the
gain in utility in the  recipient country or countries.4 3
However, the  actual level of aid allocations by donor countries
seems  to reflect the much weaker moral premise  that  if  it is
possible to  contribute to welfare  in poor countries without
sacrificing anything of moral or economic significance  in the
donor country it should be done.44  There seems to be an
implicit moral judgment among the citizens and governments of
the  rich countries that  the moral obligation to  feed the poor
in Ethiopia is  stronger than a moral obligation to assure a 6
percent rather than a 5 percent per year rate of growth in
Ethiopian GNP.4 5
Neither the commitment to  development assistance nor the
commitment to a particular level of development assistance
provides guidance as  to who should receive aid.  The acceptable
ethical considerations that support the  distributive justice
argument imply that assistance should be  directed to  improving
the welfare of the poorest individuals in the poorest
countries.  But there  is  also an ethical argument that aid
should be directed into uses that produce  the  largest
increments  of income  from each dollar of assistance--the
argument that assistance resources  are  limited and should not
be wasted.
18The  empirical evidence does not permit any clear
inferences concerning aid impact on savings, investment, and
rate  of growth.  There  is,  however, evidence that assistance
resources have  generated relatively high marginal rates of
return--rates of return that are high relative to what  the same
resources would have earned in the  donor countries.46 What
little empirical evidence we do  have also suggests  that donor
governments are willing to  trade off some efficiency  for equity
in their aid allocations--that recipient  income levels do  carry
modest weight in the allocation of aid resources. 47  But we
have little more than anecdotal evidence on the  distributive
impacts of development assistance in  recipient countries.48
Acceptance of responsibility for assistance does not
resolve  the question of what  form of assistance to offer.  The
goals of assistance  range from attempting to  assure  immediate
"subsistence rights"  or basic needs,4 9  to assistance  designed
to strengthen the capacity of a nation to meet the  subsistence
requirements  of its  own people,  or to modifying the
institutions  that influence the  resource flows among nations.
On some grounds  it would seem obligatory to  secure some minimum
level of subsistence before allocating resources  to  the other
two  objectives.  But this conclusion is  not at  all obvious  if
the effect  is  to preclude either (a) expansion of the capacity
needed to  assure future  subsistence or  (b) reform of the  rules
of conduct that govern economic and political relationships
19among nations  (i.e.,  reforming of  the GATT rules on
agricultural  trade).
A fourth issue  is the extent to which development
assistance policy and administration should be directed to
bringing about institutional reform in the recipient country.
The extent to which development assistance directed either
toward meeting basic needs or to  strengthening the  recipient
countries'  capacity for economic growth will depend on the
institutions  that influence relations among individual
citizens, economic and social organizations, and the
government.  Different institutional arrangements will
influence how different socio-economic classes, different
ethnic groups, and residents of rural and urban areas
participate in programs designed to meet basic subsistence,
health, and education objectives.  Different institutional
arrangements with respect to  the organization and stability of
property rights and the system by which the public revenue is
generated and spent will affect  the production decisions  of
farmers and the  investment decisions  of industrial
entrepreneurs.
If a donor government's  ethical concern extends  to an
obligation to assure  the citizens of the donor country that  the
resources devoted to assistance are used effectively, either
for immediate relief of subsistence needs or to  generate
longer-term economic growth,  it can hardly avoid also entering
into  a dialogue with the  recipient country about institutional
20reform when it enters  into negotiations with a recipient
country about resource transfers.  The rationale for  focusing
on institutional reform is  the hope  that the moral concern that
provided a rationale  for assistance will contribute to  capacity
in the recipient country to more effectively provide for basic
needs and generate the  growth necessary to  improve the  quality
of  life.50  The obligation to enter into a dialogue on issues
of  institutional reform imposes on the donor country the
requirement  to build the  capacity in its  own cultural and
social science disciplines necessary  to enter into  the
dialogue.  These capacities should be guided more by pragmatic
consideration about the potential impact of policy reform in
the recipient country than either ideological considerations
based on the  donor's  internal political processes or  its own
economic or political self-interest.
In Conclusion
The first  conclusion that emerges from  this  review is  the
weakness of the  self-interest argument  for foreign assistance.
The  individual  (or group) self-interest arguments, when
examined carefully, often turn out to  represent a hidden agenda
for domestic rather than international resource transfers.  The
political "realists"  have not been able,  or have not  thought  it
worthwhile, to demonstrate  the presumed political and security
benefits from the  strategic assistance component of the  aid
budget.  Rawlsian contractarian theory does provide  a basis  for
21ethical responsibility toward the poor  in poor countries that
goes beyond the traditional religious and moral obligations of
charity.  It also provides  a basis for making judgments about
the degree of  inequality that  is  ethically acceptable.
But the contractarian argument cannot stand by itself.
The credibility of the contractarian argument is  weakened if,
in fact, the  transfers do not achieve the desired consequences.
Failures  of analysis  or design can produce worse consequences
than if no assistance had been undertaken.51  There is no
obligation to  transfer resources  that do not generate either
immediate welfare gains or growth in the capacity of poor
states to meet  the needs of their citizens.  It becomes
important, therefore, to evaluate  the consequences of
development assistance and to  consider the policy interventions
that can lead to more effective development assistance
programs.
Since the  1950s  our understanding of the development
process has made major advances.  But we can never fully know
the consequences of any assistance activity or intervention
into complex and interdependent social systems.  Our limited
knowledge about how to  give and use aid to contribute most
effectively contribute to development does not, however,
protect us  from an obligation to  assess the consequences of
either our strategic or development assistance or to  advance
our capacity to understand the role of external assistance  in
the development process.
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